

Monday, December 14, 2015

DE comments on Nathan Jones thesis: "One Misstep Could Trigger a Great War"

War Scare 1983, AA 83, RYAN

Reagan: US-SU war " "two spiders in a bottle locked in a suicidal fight until both were dead."

Better than "scorpions": where the one who bites first might live (is that true?) Most dangerous: spiders who think like scorpions, unrealistically!

"Operation RYAN –a global effort to provide strategic warning of a U.S. nuclear first strike erroneously reported to the Center that the NATO military exercise Able Archer 83 was really a cover for a planned nuclear attack upon the USSR, causing the USSR to ready nuclear strike forces in East Germany and Poland. "

Did they really say it "was": or might be"?

This essay argues that that American foreign policy during the Reagan Administration contributed to the Soviet Union's fear of American attack; that the United States intelligence community either failed to detect, or ignored, signs of this genuine Soviet fear;

Thus, the US continued provocative PSYOPS probes that increased SU feeling of danger, and thus danger to the US (the intell community knew of alleged fear, but not of the covert operations! The operators knew of the ops but not of the fear, or its implications. The president was told not to fear the SU fear (by Gates and...) AA went ahead; also P-II deployment, etc.

Cold War II was real, on both sides. And dangerous!

And looked like CW III! (starting...? For Russians...?)

And CW II was started by Jimmy Carter (and crew)! And he initiated many of the dangers, the provocations! Despite his original impulses wrt strategic nuclear arsenal.

It's déjà vu all over again! (p. 10, Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 265: "the early 1980s had a feeling of déjà vu." (After "relative parity and cordiality achieved by the two powers during the 20 years since the Missiles of October" "had disappeared by 1983, paving the way for the Missiles of November." (P-II!)

(Not as farce.)

[What was Haig talking about: SU lack of restraint ("must show control of its client, Cuba": Haig wanted to invade?! "must behave like a responsible power": what, Africa? Cuba in Africa? Reagan: SU search for superiority? (something to this: but not for attack! (Unless—Andropov—preemption !)

CPD had pressured Carter, successfully; then they formed Reagan's administration!

(No one mentions what Carter and then Reagan were doing to the SU in Afghanistan!

And also, agitation in Poland!

Reagan: like "roll-back." (Poland? Afghanistan.) SDI (clear departure from nuclear parity), as well as P-II, causes SU to question missile-reduction treaties: walk-out 23 November (!) 1983 of INF and START talks.

Well, COULD P-II reach Moscow or not? Is Fischer right in saying this belief was erroneous? Could it have been placed, or extended in flight

(smaller warhead? Third stage?) to reach Moscow? Was it capable of longer-range than had been tested?]

August 4, 1983: decision to actively try to block deployment. (Mastny claims that war scare was called off after 23 November 1983 vote for deployment in Bundestag.

[Anyway, their belief and response shows the importance of decapitation to Soviets. Steinbruner had warned that P-II would be provocative.

Indeed, a small, five-minute window to launch a successful nuclear counterstrike put the very theory of Mutually Assured Destruction into question. 16

[NO, quite the contrary. MAD could be assured without any need for warning at all. It was D-L preemption, the contradiction of MAD, that was put in question.] Delegation, Dead Hand, sufficient (especially as deterrent, perhaps bluff: though the unwillingness of both sides to announce this did threaten to void deterrence!

Announcing tac nucs and delegation would have deterred invasion and limited war (which would have gone all-out, otherwise!) Announcing Dead Hand would deter decap and surprise attack: all-out war! LOW was not necessary to deterrence IF you announced delegation; it was necessary (only) if you wouldn't announce it!

P'II did NOT put pressure on for LOW: it put pressure on for delegation. (Which Ogarkov wanted, naturally!)

RYaN was not needed for det-I: only for preemption/D-L (which was infeasible, and omnicidal). (BTW, preemption has to be massive.

Retaliation does not have to be, to be deterrent (York); it can even be a bluff, if the survivable capabilities exist.

“Reagan’s early buildup compelled Soviet nuclear strategy to rely on preemption, and hence, made the United States less safe.”

No, it didn’t compel this response: the buildup, plus the possibility of decap, compelled delegation: and if this was announced, you had as much deterrence as you could get.

(Still, like K, Andropov chose not to announce. Sounds dangerous? And if you believe in war-fighting, then you want: 1) secret weapons (as on Cuba); and surprise preemption. Crazy to believe in war-fighting, since mid-Sixties (for either side: crazy always for SU!), and since 1983, nuclear winter.

The problem with stability was not only on the US side (though here again, the US drove the problem: York.)

18. Reagan crazy like Republicans today. (SU seeking world domination (not just, Great Power influence like US, in Africa...)

In June 1982, Reagan continued his call for the end of the Soviet Union. In an address to the British Parliament he described:

countries” caused by Western military developments and introduction of

“A plan and a hope for the long term - the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people... Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best— a crusade for freedom.⁵⁷

Six months later, in his State of the Union Address, Reagan stated that to achieve peace, “the Soviet Union must show by deeds as well as words a sincere commitment to respect the rights and sovereignty of the family of nations.”⁵⁸

What the hell was he talking about: unless East Europe (which was indeed tyrannized)? Roll-back? “We will bury you.” (How did that go over in the US?)

When Reagan assumed the presidency, the Soviets were ready and hopeful for mutual cooperation with the United States. As his rhetoric illustrates, Reagan spurned engagement with the USSR. Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained in a 1984 interview, the early Soviet-American hostilities [were not] a tit-for-tat response. The Soviets stayed very, very moderate, very, very responsible during the first three years of this administration. I was mind-boggled with their patience. They were genuinely trying. What they hadn’t faced up to was what it would really take to convince us.⁵⁹

[Well, what did it take? Convince us of what?

In November 1982, Brezhnev publicly announced an end to the Soviet Union’s attempt for mutual cooperation with the

United States. "We know well," Brezhnev stated, "that peace with the imperialists is not for the asking. It can be safeguarded only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces."⁶⁰ Reagan's rhetoric had impelled Soviet policy to shift from diplomatic to militaristic means.

The Reagan administration's rhetoric reached its most inflammatory and

⁵⁷ Ronald W. Reagan, Address to Members of the British Parliament, Royal Gallery at the Palace of Westminster, London, 8 June 1982. ⁵⁸ Ronald W. Reagan, State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress, Washington, D.C., 25 January 1983.

⁵⁹ Roy Guttman, "Bad Tidings: The World According to Haig," *Newsday Magazine*, 12 August 1984, p. 18. ⁶⁰ Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 85.

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threatening point on 8 March 1983, when Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be "the focus of evil in the modern world." In this speech, Reagan asked his followers "to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts" –that is, those supporting policies of rapprochement or a **nuclear freeze**.

47 percent of *Americans* polled by Gallup on 22 December 1983 felt that the Reagan administration's defense policies had brought the United States "closer to war."⁶²

The outcome of Reagan's rhetoric, combined with his downgrading of diplomatic efforts and vast military buildup proved to be the exact opposite of what he had hoped to achieve. Regan wrote in his memoirs: "at the foundation of my foreign policy, I decided we had to send as powerful message as we could to the Russians... Our policy was to be

one based on strength and realism. I wanted

⁶¹ Reagan, National Association of Evangelicals, 8 March 1983. ⁶² Only 28 percent of Americans polled stated they believed the Reagan administration's defense policies had brought the United States "closer to peace." In a separate question, 40 percent of Americans felt it "very likely" or "fairly likely" that the United States would "get into a nuclear war within the next ten years." George Gallup, Jr., *The 1983 Gallup Poll*, (New York: SR Books, 1984), 265-266.

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peace through strength, not peace through a piece of paper."⁶³

"A Mirror-Image of Reagan's Own Policy"

What Reagan viewed as "peace through strength," the Soviets regarded as sheer aggression. In his memoirs, Ambassador Dobrynin claims that Reagan's early foreign policy "was exactly the opposite from the one intended by Washington" and,

It strengthened those in the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the security apparatus who had been pressing for a mirror-image of Reagan's own policy. Ronald Reagan managed to create a solid front of hostility among our leaders. Nobody trusted him. Any of his proposals almost automatically were considered with suspicion. This unique situation in our relations threatened dangerous consequences.⁶⁴

On 4 January 1983, Andropov, now General Secretary of the CPSU, gave a speech in Prague to the Political Consultative Committee, the controlling organ of the Warsaw Pact countries. Andropov spoke decried the escalation of Western weapons capabilities, especially the European deployment of

Minuteman and Pershing II missiles. He announced that the Warsaw Pact's only option was to continue striving to maintain parity but warned,

The new round of the arms race, which is being imposed by the United States, has principal qualitative features that distinguish it from the previous ones. If in the past the Americans, when speaking about their nuclear weapons, preferred to emphasize the fact that those were, first of all, means of "deterrence," now, by creating the improved missile systems, they are not trying to conceal the fact that those are realistically designed for a future war. [**But these weapons would not serve "realistically" to win or even survive a nuclear war with the SU. Prevail in the sense of postwar military capability? What use is this without national survival?**

What Carter—who started this!—and Reagan sought was: the concrete *appearance* that we *possibly believe we might (or would) win* a nuclear war: a "not entirely incredible first-strike capability," or what we might even foolishly consider "a splendid first-strike capability" (HK, Herman Kahn). So SU could "not be sure" we would never strike first (even if we didn't expect or falsely believe SU would attack us).

This was supposed to—and conceivably might—cause the SU to be conciliatory, not provocative, in its foreign policy, wishing not to provoke the US to a FS. Or it might—as it did—cause the hawks in the SU to IMITATE it, achieve parity in this, deny US superiority, so the US could tread lightly itself; and meanwhile (especially if this was economically infeasible) prepare to preempt (!) our attack (preempt our preemption or escalation).

The opposite of a deterrent effect)! so as to do the best they could if a US attack looked otherwise likely or inevitable. (Even though, “realistically,” preemption would do them no good at all. Still, their military could be counted on to tell themselves they were seeking “prevailing” or “victory.” This is where the doctrines of a "rational" or "limited" nuclear war come from, this is the source of the arguments about the possibility to survive

⁶³ Reagan, *An American Life*, 267. ⁶⁴ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 482.

and to win in a protracted nuclear conflict.”⁶⁵ Andropov, believing Reagan to have aims of winning a nuclear war, stepped up the Warsaw Pact security establishment.

21 Alternatively, they could have gone for minimum or maximum deterrence (even explain “nuclear winter”!!! officially. Soviet scientists did know this; but did their leadership believe it? They didn’t declare it! Show their plans, challenge us to show our plans, and analyze their effects! That’s what I hoped for Gorbachev to do, if he’d stayed in. But Andropov could already have done it.) and done their best to disabuse us of any belief or even pretense that we could meaningfully “prevail” (i.e., prevail with national survival.”

You don’t show the US they can’t win a nuclear war by imitating their efforts to prepare to win a nuclear war. US inability to win didn’t depend on SU preemption (which they didn’t even announce, anyway: how could they? In other words, they bought no deterrence with their effort and their

secret intelligence alert. On the contrary, their continued buildup, themselves (SS-18, etc. SS-20!) made a US preemptive strike more attractive! And RYaN always had the strong possibility of a false alarm! AT LEAST as strong as tactical warning (contrary to their beliefs). It was BASED on a false alarm, in terms of strategic intelligence, as interpreted by Ustinov, Kryuchkov, Andropov, Ogarkov. (ov: bad news). (vs. Khrushchev, Gorbachev, even Brezhnev.... Malenkov is out of line.)

They managed to see Hitler in Reagan. And his rhetoric certainly encouraged this, though it was misleading!

He[Dobrynin] also wrote that none of the General Secretaries for whom he served – Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Gorbachev – believed “an attack could take place unexpectedly at any moment.” Andropov proved the “probable exception” to this; he recalled a “very private” conversation with Andropov in which he cautioned that **“Reagan is unpredictable. You should expect anything from him.”**⁷⁰

The effect Nixon wanted! (Did he ever achieve it?!!!) But then he went for détente! It's what StratCom wanted: when was that?

By November 1983, however, the critically ill Andropov had dropped out of public view and his grasp on power was slipping.⁷¹ CIA analysts at the time speculated – and it has since been confirmed – that during this period the Politburo

was steered by the triumvirate of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Andropov, and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov. Of the three, Gromyko was the most “moderate” and, due to his familiarity to the West, was likely doubtful of a Western first strike. According to McFarlane, Gromyko was the “ultimate guarantor” against miscalculation. “He had been in Washington many, many years, and understood our processes and the consultative process between

⁶⁹ Kalugin, *The First Directorate*, 302. ⁷⁰ Gordievsky describe Soviet leadership in 1983 as, “self-isolated, self-indoctrinated,” and “under the influence of their own propaganda.” House Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, *Russian Threat Perceptions and Plans for Sabotage Against the United States*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, 13; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 528-259. ⁷¹ He was not present at 2 September 1983, 20 October 1983, or 15 November 1983 meetings of the Politburo. At the time, there was a rumor circulating through Moscow that there had been an assassination attempt on his life. 4 August 1983, Zasedanie politbyuro TsK KPSS (Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union); 2 September 1983, Zasedanie politbyuro TsK KPSS; 20 October 1983, Zasedanie politbyuro TsK KPSS, in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov Papers, Container 26, Reel 17; 12 December 1983, *Whither the Soviet Leadership*, National Intelligence Council Report, in CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration NARA, College Park, MD, 3.

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Congress and the Presidency about any significant escalation of the use of force.”⁷²

Accounts from Soviet political elite generally place Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov to the right of Andropov. Oleg Gordievsky speculates that Ustinov advocated the creation of Operation RYAN to Andropov in 1981; in December 1982, Ustinov condemned Western military doctrines “which stem from the strategy of ‘direct confrontation’ proclaimed by Washington and are directed at achieving military

superiority over the Soviet Union and establishing U.S. world supremacy.”⁷³

But in 1983 power in the Soviet Union was not wholly centered in the Politburo; the military’s grasp on power was expanding.

So, in ascending order of hawkishness: Gromyko; Andropov; Ustinov; Ogarkov.

Ustinov, the most hawkish of the triumvirate, appears to have been more rational than Soviet Military leadership. Take, for example, the issue of nuclear war fighting: in January of 1982, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military, published a pamphlet entitled, “Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland.” In it he glorified “the cult of the offensive,” the importance of surprise in military operations, and alluded to the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike. He stated that nuclear weapons would give Soviet

⁷² Robert McFarlane interview conducted by author, 22 April, 2009. ⁷³ Andrew and Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions*; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 67. ⁷⁴ 12 December 1983, *Whither the Soviet Leadership*, 6.

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commanders, “the increased ability to achieve war aims.”⁷⁵

Ustinov released a pamphlet in May 1982 entitled, “Serving the Country,”

which strongly contradicted Ogarkov’s assertions about the viability of nuclear war. Ustinov wrote, “[t]o count on victory

in the arms race and in the nuclear war is madness.” Nuclear war, he wrote, would cause “irreplaceable losses,” and would destroy “entire peoples and their civilizations.”⁷⁶

While it is clear that Andropov and Ustinov were fearful of a Western first strike, it is also clear that leaders of the military were more likely to suspect, attempt to preempt, and believe they could win a nuclear war with the West.

[But our military never talked like Ustinov: nor did their programs or plans reflect such views! They sounded and acted like Ogarkov, i.e. like LeMay and Power. So Pipes wasn't wrong about SU military ! But that didn't mean we should imitate them! (actually, they were imitating us. Both crazy.)

Has NatSecArchive—Burr—ever compared explicitly this SU military planning with ours?! SAC, Stratcom...Pd-59...(= SIOP-62!)

Mine was wrong, infeasible; that didn't mean JCS should have gone back to SIOP-62, or war-fighting, as they did! There was no way to manage the operation of a Doomsday Machine, no way to make SAC operations—on the scale programmed and planned, and sure to escalate to-- being a DM!

A force greater than...100? 200? Less?...that hits 100 (?) cities with thermonuclear weapons IS a DM, and nothing else. If you're planning to do that, or threatening with the

capability—you have no other function to be served by having anything else or more! UNLESS you feel, with basis, that you can't make it sufficiently credible that you will respond to an attack with anything at all, with ten warheads on cities (or five, or twenty) unless you can pretend to believe that you can "limit damage" from a large enemy attack by preempting and decapitation. I.e., pretend to be deluded. (not too hard). (Decap itself doesn't require more than 1-10-50 weapons; but if you want to be able to "dig out" remaining enemy weapons....subs?) (OR hold off their use by your reserves of ten or so warheads). That might help a threat to escalate a conflict unless the other terminates it, Type II; but if the capability is there for that threat, it's probably going to escalate anyway! FU is crazily reckless with or without that threat or capability.

[If he comes at you with a knife, run." If Hitler comes at you with a nuc...? (Nixon vs. NVN: they didn't run). (It simply didn't work. Moratorium helped; but was it necessary? Would they have conceded otherwise? Almost surely not; but there, the expectation that the antiwar movement would keep him, if not from the initial attack (it almost failed), then from expecting to continue them (that it did) would keep them going. Would that have worked if SU had used nucs in Afghanistan? DID THEY CONSIDER IT? NEUTRON BOMBS?

Gordievsky, Kalugin, and Wolf – it is important to note – were extremely skeptical of the idea of a NATO first strike. Wolf recalls, "[l]ike most intelligent

⁷⁷ Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum*. ⁷⁸ Kocher, Karl. In *Novosti razvedki i kontrrazvedki*. (News of intelligence agents and counter agents), 1

September 2006. ⁷⁹ Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, 9 March 1984, AMVR, Fond 1, Record 12, File 553, Provided by Jordan Baev. ⁸⁰ Rendek, "Operation ALAN – Mutual Cooperation of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and the Soviet KGB as Given in One of the Largest Leakage Cases of NATO Security Data in the Years 1982 – 1986," Presented at The NKVD/KGB Activities and its Cooperation with other Secret Services in Central and Eastern Europe 1945 – 1989 Conference, Bratislava, 14-16 November 2007.

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people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time.”⁸¹ Despite his skepticism, Wolf forwarded his agency’s Operation RYAN surveillance to his Soviet allies who were more persuaded by these “indicators” of possible nuclear war. Dobrynin and Gordievsky believed that the drive for Operation RYAN came from the leadership of Andropov, Ustinov and KGB chief of Foreign Operations, Vladimir Kryuchkov —the last guards of the Stalinist mentality.

[Thus, like Clifford in Vietnam under LBJ, before he became SecDef, they were “silent doves” (like many on Afghanistan, no doubt). Doing their job to carry on crazy policies (like JTM, etc.)

Although most agents did not believe an attack was imminent, they were ordered to report their raw observations of events, not their estimation of what the observations meant. This critical flaw in the Soviet intelligence system— coined by Gordievsky as the “intelligence cycle”— played a key role in exacerbating the Soviet leadership’s fear of a US nuclear strike, even though Soviet agents abroad seriously doubted that an American attack was imminent. One American official believed Soviet intelligence agents abroad were “just going through the motions.”⁸²

But Andropov’s moaning to Harriman (29) didn’t serve its purpose either, even though Harriman believed the fear to be genuine. Harriman’s report could be interpreted (as it

was by the Acting DCI, John McMahon (McGovern note?) that Andropov was just trying nuclear blackmail, war by miscalculation (neither saying explicitly that he feared a US FS, nor than the SU might have to preempt). To mobilize his population (and West Germany).

SNIE November 1983: acknowledged that “with less likelihood,” “The Soviets might consider themselves backed into a corner and lash out dangerously.” [Who believed this? Not leadership.” In 1983, US intelligence errantly believed the Soviet Union was just “huffing and puffing.”

Reagan reacts to KAL-007 shoot-down the way that Carter reacted to the Afghan invasion in Christmas Eve, 1979, four years earlier (to amazement of SU: aside from the fact that Carter had deliberately helped provoke this). Was PSYOPS still going on?!! And Reagan knew he was lying that SU had knowingly shot down a civilian airliner and that they did not believe it was on an intelligence mission. (Though such a mission would hardly justify shooting it down!) But that too was a mistake, a false alarm. (See Petrov)

Note (no one mentions!) that AA 83 was exercising an INSANE NATO policy: FU, and escalated second-use (apparently, still a LNW, another insanity!). SU, too, in June 1982 had “seven hour simulation” of nuclear war. (How did that go?) p. 33n

(Note SecDef Brown, earlier, in an exercise, “chasing SU units in Europe with strategic weapons”: and “shoot/look/shoot.” Purpose of PD-59. Odom!)

David Abshire, US Ambassador to NATO from July 1983 to January 1987, explained that in the usual NATO war game scenario, the Soviet Union broke through NATO lines on the continent and headed towards the English Channel; at this point, when they crossed the “nuclear trip wire,” SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command of Europe) would request to launch a signal attack on a Warsaw Pact country. If the USSR did not “understand” this signal, SACEUR would request another signal, this time attacking a Soviet republic. The

exercises frequently concluded when the actors “got word from the White House that the Soviets

⁹⁴ Eighth Air Force Strategic Air Command, *History*.

⁹⁵ The Soviet Union also routinely conducted large-scale military exercises, including June 1982

“seven hour simulation” of nuclear war. Ostensibly, the June 1982 exercise was less realistic than

Able Archer 83. Mastney, “How Able was ‘Able Archer’,” 115; Eighth Air Force Strategic Air

Command, *History*. ⁹⁶

⁹⁷ Edgar P. Sneed, Supporting documents to *History of the 332nd Airlift Division: January 1982- December 1983*, obtained by Freedom of Information Act request.

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understand our determination and will withdraw from Europe.”⁹⁸

PSYOPs and False Alarms

A number of secret psychological military operations (PSYOP) which the United States conducted before Able Archer 83 caused further distortion and steered Soviet intelligence into reporting their belief in the increased likelihood of US aggression. These operations were intended “to keep [the Soviets] guessing what might come next.”⁹⁹ US warships penetrated the far northern and eastern regions of the Soviet Union, areas where they had never before operated. In August and September of 1983, a US, British, Canadian, and Norwegian naval armada sailed through the strategically important Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GUIK) gap undetected by the Soviets. During that period, US naval ships began operation in “forward areas” such as

the Baltic, Black, and Barents Seas. US planes also probed Soviet air defense near their borders. These PSYOPs “exposed gaping holes in Soviet ocean surveillance and early warning systems.” They also alarmed Soviet leadership. According to a former US official with knowledge of the PSYOPs, “It really got to them... They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would light up and units would go on alert. Then at the last minute the squadron would

⁹⁸ David Abshire interview conducted by author, 29 February 2008. Abshire “was not a M.A.D. man.” He recollected to me that he had always wanted to tell Reagan during a drill that Soviets were launching a nuclear attack on Boston but not to worry, “It’s only signaling.” **[Abshire thought this, but of course he didn’t say it. Ever.]** His account follows the description provided in Shaun R. Gregory, *Nuclear command and Control in NATO*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).

⁹⁹ Fischer, “A Cold War Conundrum.”

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peel off and return home.”¹⁰⁰

Jesus Christ!

OK, so all this WAS before KAL-007. We WERE provoking, as in TG 1962, as in Afghanistan 1979. DID US INTELL ANALYSTS KNOW OF THESE PSYOPS, IN INTERPRETING KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN? (THEY DIDN'T IN 1981-82.)

SEE TURK SHOOTDOWN OF RUSSIAN PLANE LAST MONTH, IN TURKISH AIRSPACE (ALLEGEDLY! FOR 17 SECONDS. “NOT A CIVILIAN AIRLINER.” WHAT ABOUT VINCENNES, WHICH NO ONE EVER MENTIONS?)

QUOTE GELB, NYT, ON SOVS AS ALIENS.

In addition to these PSYOPs and missile-detection malfunctions, a series of world events likely led Soviet agents

abroad to report further “indicators” of a Western nuclear attack. US military bases heightened their security following the 11 October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut which killed 220 Marines. The 25 October 1983 US invasion of the British protectorate of Grenada to prevent a Marxist revolution, also triggered an influx of ciphered communications between Great Britain and the United States.¹⁰²

The realistic nature of the drill further encouraged reports of an actual

¹⁰⁰ Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 8; Fischer, “A Cold War Conundrum.” ¹⁰¹ Pry, *War Scare*, 37.

¹⁰² Pry, *War Scare*, 33-44.

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attack. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl participated (though not concurrently) in the nuclear drill. US principals – including the Secretary of Defense, the Vice President, and the President – were originally supposed to participate. Due to the “considerable tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States,” McFarlane appealed to the President to scale back high level participation in the exercise, Reagan agreed.¹⁰³

Soviet intelligence caused further alarm when it reported that NATO was, indeed, using unique, never-before-seen procedures as well as message formats more sophisticated than previous exercises.¹⁰⁴ Communication was simulated with new Pershing II missiles. Pershing IIs were not actually deployed to Europe until 23 November but former CIA

analyst Peter Vincent Pry speculates that it is likely that Soviet intelligence believed several Pershing II missiles to have been deployed before their announced date.¹⁰⁵ [WHY WOULDN'T THIS COMMUNICATION DURING EXERCISE HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO CONVINCE SU THAT P-IIS WERE ALREADY THERE?]

During a January 2000 Congressional testimony, the former CIA analyst Pry asserted Able Archer 83 was “more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Pry, *War Scare*, 44; House Committee on Government Reform, *Russian Threats to the United States Security in the Post- Cold War Era*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2000, 70.

he CIA reported activity in the Baltic Military District and Czechoslovakia; nuclear-capable aircraft in Poland and Germany were placed “on high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces.”¹⁰⁹ Former CIA analyst Peter Vincent Pry suspects that the aircraft were

¹⁰⁷ Andrew and Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions*, 79. ¹⁰⁸ The United States also feared that exercise could be used as “ruses of war.” Caspar Weinberger explained that, it is sometimes quite difficult to tell the difference between an exercise and the beginning –the raising of indicators [of a nuclear attack] that we watch all the time every day, every hour... The difference between a realistic exercise or maneuver and what could be preparations for an attack, that line is sometimes quite blurred.” He recounts a North Korean drill where, “they were moving a hell of a lot of stuff in position,” and he became worried that if it was not simply a drill, “we’ve lost about five days of time,” to prepare for war. Caspar Weinberger conducted by Don Orberdorfer, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; 17 February 1983, KGB to London Residency, No. 373/PR/52 in Andrew and Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions*, 69; A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive (A Soviet View)* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970), 115. ¹⁰⁹ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 271-272; Pry, *War Scare*, 43-44; May 1984 Central Intelligence Agency Special National Intelligence Estimate, *Implications*

merely the tip of the iceberg; he hypothesizes that— in accordance with Soviet military procedure and history— ICBM silos, already at a high state of alert and difficult for the United States to detect, were also prepared for a launch.¹¹⁰ Commander Victor Tkachenko, stationed at a Soviet Missile Silo during Able Archer 83, recounts, “When we reached the command bunker that night, we received a special order. We were told to immediately go to raised combat alert. It was so serious that there was a third man there with us, to maintain uninterrupted communications.”¹¹¹

Sergei Tarasenko, who worked in the Foreign Ministry and later worked as assistant to Eduard Shevardnadze confirms that during Able Archer 83

[First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi] Kornienko summoned me and showed me a top secret KGB paper. . . In the paper, the KGB reported that they had information that the United States had prepared everything for a first strike; that they might resort to a surgical strike against command centers in the Soviet Union; and that they had the capability to destroy the system by incapacitating the command center.¹¹²

Vitalii Tsygichko, an analyst on the Soviet General Staff during Able Archer 83, elaborated on the mentality of the Soviet military and political leadership: during a 2006 oral history conference:

Among politicians as well as the military, **there were a lot of crazy people who would not consider the consequences of a nuclear strike. They just wanted to respond to a certain action without dealing with the “cause and effect” problems.** They were not seeking

of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities, in CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration NARA, College Park, MD. ¹¹⁰ During a January 2000 Congressional testimony, the former CIA analyst Pry asserted Able Archer 83 was “more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Pry, *War Scare*, 44; House Committee on Government Reform, *Russian Threats to the United States Security in the Post- Cold War Era*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2000, 70.

¹¹¹ Interview with Viktor Tkachenko, for “Soviet War Scare 1983.” Director Henry Chancellor; Exec Producer Taylor Downing; Quoted with permission of Flashback Television, London, 2008. ¹¹² William Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 71.

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any reasonable explanations, but used one selective response to whatever an option was. I know many military people who look like normal people, but it was difficult to explain to them that waging nuclear war was not feasible. We had a lot of arguments in this respect. Unfortunately, as far as I know, there are a lot of stupid people both in NATO and our country.¹¹³

¹¹⁷ I have had a conversation with a nuclear submarine officer who was serving off the coast of Scotland during Able Archer 83. He stated that during the exercise his ship went to DEFCON 2. He recounts that his Commanding Officer stated over the intercom, “Spin up missiles this is not a drill. Repeat spin up missiles, this is not a drill.” The officer recounted that during drills, his submarine typically left missiles in position for no longer than 45 minutes. But in this case his missiles were up for more than six hours. “The situation was very tense,” he recalled.

BOOK: SEE “SET” FOR PREEMPTION. AND ALL-OUT DESTRUCTION. AND DECAP. (Refighting WWII, with TN weapons. On both sides.)

In February 1990 the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board issued a 110-page report which concluded that Soviet leadership “**may have** taken seriously the possibility of a US nuclear strike against the Soviet Union,”

[This in May, 2009; from accounts by Oberdorfer, 1990, and his book. But did it say “may have”? Or “did”? The difference!

Gates confirms, to Oberdorfer, in 1990:

Robert Gates, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence during Able Archer 83, concurs:

Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of the Soviet leaders during those times that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think **there is a good chance** – with all of the other events in 1983 – that they really felt a NATO attack **was at least possible** and that they took a number of measures to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. After going through the experience at the time, then

¹²⁴ Colonel L. V. Levadov, “Itogi operativnoi podgotovki obedinennix sil NATO v 1983 godu” (Results of the Operational Training of NATO Joint Armed Forces in 1983,” *Voyennaya Misl’* (Military Thought), no. 2 (February 1984), 68. ¹²⁵ I have a Mandatory Declassification Review Request pending with the CIA for this document. Cited in Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds*, 334.

¹²⁶ I have heard this document referred to as the Cold War historian's "Holy Grail." I have a Mandatory Declassification Review Request pending with The George H. W. Bush Presidential Library for this document. Robert Gates interview conducted by Don Orberdorfer, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; Anonymous Intelligence Analyst interview conducted by Don Oberdorfer, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 1990. Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War*, 67.

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through the postmortems, and now through the documents, I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack was imminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous. And US intelligence had failed to grasp the true extent of their anxiety.¹²⁷

(There was more than "a good chance" that they felt it was "at least possible." They flatly did believe that, throughout 1981-85.]

In 1990, Ronald Reagan was asked why he thought relations between the Soviet Union and United States had improved so dramatically. Reagan answered that it was due to mutual interest: Gorbachev's interest in dealing with the economic emergency in the Soviet Union, and Reagan's belief that **"it was a danger to have a world so heavily armed that one misstep could trigger a great war."**¹³⁰

Yes: and Jones attributes the effect of Reagan's retrospective knowledge of AA 83 as being [in effect, like the effect of C-II on JFK and K!]

Moreover, on Oct. 10 he saw *The Day After*. Reagan wrote in his diary that the film was "very effective and left me greatly

depressed.”¹³¹ This glimpse of nuclear war psychologically primed Reagan for Able Archer 83, giving him a very specific picture of what would occur had the situation escalated further. Days after Able Archer 83, McFarlane shared intelligence reports describing the Soviet’s nuclear

¹³⁰ Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War*, 479. ¹³¹ Reagan, *Diaries*, 186.

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activity after Able Archer. The President read the reports and responded with “genuine anxiety” and disbelief that his actions could have led to an armed attack; “It did bother him that they [the Soviets] could even take seriously the very idea [of a US strike].”¹³² Other officials, including Shultz believed it to be “incredible, at least to us” that the Soviets would believe the US would launch a genuine attack.¹³³ Reagan did not share the belief that cooler heads would prevail, he wrote:

We had many contingency plans for responding to a nuclear attack. But everything would happen so fast that I wondered how much planning or reason could be applied in such a crisis...*Six minutes* to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon! How could anyone apply reason at a time like that (Reagan 1999)?”¹³⁴

{Here, and not only here, Reagan looks better than others, say, Shultz (or Gates).

[But, like Carter (under pressure from CPD), Reagan did want the capability to make the Soviets believe that we might strike first (as JFK said to Alsop in 62) (and as I, effect, wanted JFK to threaten in October 61; WAS I disturbed when JFK threatened this in February 1962? I don’t actually recall, but I should have been, from this. Or Athens/Ann Arbor, which K took as a FS

threat! Would knowing this have bothered me? Oh dear. But then, there was no risk of a deliberate preemptive strike by K. Putting missiles in Cuba, though, and threatening a FU or FS, that's what he did do! Like Sovs in 1983: except they didn't threaten, did they, they just prepared: crazily! And that's what K did in Cuba!)

So maybe what US officials couldn't believe was that the SU would believe we would strike first in a surprise attack when there was no ongoing conflict or public crisis. So they didn't worry or imagine that our moves (even PSYOPS!) could be interpreted as strengthening such an expectation! And did Reagan EVER discover that preemption was Andropov's preferred response to that: not just, "going on alert," so as to retaliate! He knew the latter, itself, was dangerous (see Petrov, and Perroots), as it was; but the SU response to their fears was even more dangerous, by far. Not only did Reagan not imagine THAT: I don't think anyone has commented on the failure of US leaders OR INTELL to consider that, until the PFIAB Report, 1990. (Who saw that? Pry? Gates did, presumably Reagan did (briefed? He didn't read a 100-page report, did he?) who in the Clinton administration read it?!!! NOW, in Obama administration? Anyone earlier???)

The impetus of Reagan's early 1984 change in policy has previously been explained as a seizure of power by the moderates in his administration, as simply election-year politics, or that Reagan, in 1984 was simply ready to negotiate.¹³⁵ Of the three explanations the third seems the most plausible. The unprecedented

¹³² A comprehensive 50-page report entitled "Soviet Perceptions of Nuclear Warfare," based primarily on Gordievsky's observations, was presented to the president in late 1985. This, however, was not the first report of Able Archer 83; information about Soviet military action was analyzed in real-time. McFarlane presented Reagan "everything that [Director of Intelligence] Bill Casey had from Gordievsky [who was] reporting that Soviet leadership really was concerned about [Able Archer 83]. And he [Reagan] was interested in that." **The 1985 report is still classified, pending a Mandatory Declassification Review request.** Robert McFarlane interview conducted by author, 22 April, 2009; Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal*, 134; Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War*, 67; Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds*, 334.

¹³³ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 464. ¹³⁴ Reagan, *American Life*, 257. ¹³⁵ Matlock ably refutes the first two of these claims in *Reagan and*

Gorbachev, 75-80. McFarlane believed that Reagan's engagement with the Soviet Union was due "more by our [American political] readiness than this episode [Able Archer 83]," but also that Able Archer 83 was "timely" and "contributed to his wanting to begin to establish the dialogue and the more active mode." Robert McFarlane interview conducted by author, 22 April, 2009.

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tensions and nuclear fear of 1983 led the president who **believed the prophecy of Armageddon would be fulfilled by a nuclear apocalypse, [is this the only mention of this fact in all these discussions? Significance? Reexamine that!!]** stated that "**MAD policy was madness,**" and wrote of civilization's regression due to nuclear weapons, to seek a policy toward the USSR which reduced, rather than increased, the risk of nuclear war.¹³⁶

There was never a MAD policy. MAD would be the result of either, or both, US and SU plans from 1964 on (and earlier US plans), even though both were creating forces and strategies which they hoped, delusionally, might avoid MAD. (McNamara may have hoped for a "lower degree of MAD" than if no D-L CF were attempted; likewise, I suppose, other SAC planners later, with some exceptions, especially those who counted on decap.) Reagan wanted to avoid MAD in a nuclear war by SDI (he was right that nothing else would do it in a war; indeed, SDI with a US FS might actually have achieved D-L, as McNamara wanted; not "an acceptable outcome" but less catastrophic than otherwise: EXCEPT for nuclear winter, which our own strikes would create!!! But he did also want nuclear abolition! Along with SDI to handle rogues, hidden weapons. (That's not crazy, wrt ICBMs alone, IF you got abolition). (But as Gorbachev, if they abandoned the ABM Treaty, what was likely to result was a US FS force, not even a reduced offensive force.)

What was crazy was not MAD as a policy in nuclear war (realistically, that was inescapable, unless forces were reduced to ten or so), but a readiness to threaten nuclear war, to preempt, to LOW, or to respond at all even to a

nuclear attack, carrying out any nuclear plans at all. If SDI could be feasible, and was effectively installed, then it would be an alternative to MAD (or, the US would have regained a monopoly, not just superiority, wrt ICBMs (only!)). But that alternative to MAD didn't exist, any more than any of the others (including HAK's LNW: or the European conflict implied by SS-20s and P-IIs, in the minds of some).

The most generally accepted conclusion, presented by Reagan's conservative base and the President himself, that "The United States was in its strongest position in two decades to negotiate with the Russians from strength," is also incorrect.¹³⁷ Even if Reagan used this rationalization as justification for his change in policy towards the Soviet Union, the United States did not hold a significantly stronger position in 1984 than it did in 1981.¹³⁸

Reagan began changing the course of his Presidency in mid November 1983,¹³⁹ days after Able Archer 83.¹⁴⁰ According to McFarlane, Able Archer 83

¹³⁶ Robert McFarlane, as cited in, Fischer, *Reagan Reversal*, 106-107; Reagan, *American Life*, 278, 549. ¹³⁷ Reagan, *American Life*, 586-587. ¹³⁸ See Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 167.

¹³⁹ On 15 November 1983, National Intelligence Officer Major General Edward B. Atkeson met with General Richard G. Stilwell to discuss Soviet military operational analysis. **I contend it is very likely this meeting concerned the Soviet Union's perceptions of Able Archer 83.** [CHECK] On 18 November, McFarlane received a Top Secret letter from Prime Minister Thatcher for President Reagan, the letter **remains classified**. [StiLL?] On the cover letter, McFarlane handwrote, "We should get something out today." It is plausible Thatcher was passing Reagan one of Gordievsky's reports

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was on the President's mind as he travelled throughout Asia from 8-14 November. **[But McFarlane briefed him on SU nuclear activity days after Able Archer. Days after Nov. 11? On the flight?]** The two spoke about the

situation several times, “on Air Force One and elsewhere.”¹⁴¹. On 18 November, the President reflected on his decision in his diary:

George Shultz & I had a talk mainly about setting up a little in house group of experts on the Soviet U. to help us in setting up some channels. I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want...

A most sobering experience with Cap W[einberger] and Gen. Vessey in the situation room—a briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack.¹⁴² **[WAS THIS HIS FIRST BRIEFING ON THE SIOP? WHEN WAS THAT?]**

This “in house group,” included of Shultz, McFarlane, Weinberger, Casey, and Bush, and was chaired by Matlock. The discussions were confidential and took place on Saturday mornings. Notes from the first meeting of 19 November reveal that the group’s policy agenda was to:

1. Reduce use and threat of force in international disputes
2. Lower high levels of armaments by equitable and verifiable agreements; and
3. Establish minimal level of trust to facilitate the first two objectives, including
 - a. Compliance with past agreements;
 - b. Human rights performance;
 - c. Specific confidence-building measures;

that things were getting dangerously out of hand. This letter may have affected Reagan's diary entry that evening. 23 November 1983, Memorandum from Major general Edward B. Atkeson for General Richard G. Stilwell, "Soviet Use of Historical Data for Operational Analyses," in CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration NARA, College Park, MD; 18 November 1983, Message from Oliver Wright to Robert C McFarlane, "Covering UK Top Secret [Message]," Reagan Presidential Library, National Security Affairs, Office of the AP for: Records: Citation File, 8391397.

¹⁴⁰ The following evidence argues contrary to Vojtech Mastny's assertion that Matlock "received his instructions to write the [16 January] speech before "Able Archer" was held." And that "[t]he shift on Reagan's part reflected general rather than specific concern about the war scare that had been spreading." Mastny, "How Able was 'Able Archer'?" 121.

¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² Reagan, *Diaries*, 199.

P. 48: Nov. 19 meeting: US policy *would not* challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet system, work towards military superiority, or attempt to force the collapse of the Soviet system.

[Are these challenges precisely what Putin believes the US is conducting right now, with respect to his regime?

[Carter intended not to seek military superiority: (see BB on PD-59) but his buildup and PD-59 were seen as precisely that!]

p. 50AA seems to have affected Reagan as C-II did JFK and K! His new policy on SU, delivered Jan. 16, 1994 (delayed from Dec. 20 on advice from Nancy

Reagan's astrologer) was meant like American University speech. Openings to Gromyko from Shultz. Call for ending to existential danger (like Andropov to Harriman in June, 1983).

Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians: Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were

¹⁴⁹ Reagan, United States-Soviet Relations, 16 January, 1984. ¹⁵⁰ 16 January 1984, Cable from George Shultz to Ray Seitz/ Brunson McKinley, "Gromyko Meeting," in CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration NARA, College Park, MD. ¹⁵¹ 16 January 1984, Cable from George Shultz to Ray Seitz/Brunson McKinley.

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genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did.... During my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike.¹⁵²

[Still no clear awareness that the Soviets might have launched a preemptive strike themselves, preempting our attack. When did this become clear? Gordievsky, or not?]

Less effect in SU. RYAN continued "until end of SU." (Beyond? Pry: 1991, Primakov; but longer?)] HAVE THEY EVER RENOUNCED PREEMPTION? HAVE WE? NO! WE WON'T GET RID OF MM UNTIL WE RENOUNCED PREEMPTION! (I.E., IN

EFFECT, D-L: WITHOUT SAYING SO! NOT JUST LOW! NFS, PERIOD! SO THEN, NO FS FROM ESCALATION, EITHER! WE CAN EVEN GIVE UMBRELLA TO NNWS (GERMANY? WHO NEEDS IT? JAPAN? WHAT IF THEY GET NUCS SOON? SHOULD WE KEEP PREEMPTION JUST FOR THAT? BUT...UKRAINE! SYRIA! (NO! UKRAINE, NO! NFU, FOR EITHER! FU AS A DECLARATORY DOCTRINE, DETERRENCE: MADNESS! IT REQUIRES A FS CAPABILITY, ON BOTH SIDES! INSTABILITY! AS IN AA 83, ON BOTH SIDES! (IF PERROOTS HAD GONE TO FULL ALERT...SEE STEINBRUNNER).

AFTER ALL, IF AA 83 SCENARIO HAD BEEN FOR REAL—THE WORLD WOULD HAVE BLOWN UP FOR THAT REASON, WITHOUT A US FS OR EVEN THE SOVIETS EXPECTING A FS! FU AGAINST EACH OTHER—CRAZY!

YES, US PRESIDENT CAN BE, AND HAS BEEN, PERCEIVED AS MAD, UNPREDICTABLE, CAPABLE OF SURPRISE FS AS WELL AS FU. HOW DID THJAT WORK OUT? (NEAR SU PREEMPTION!) (YES, IF PREEMPTION WERE SEEN AS MAD BY EITHER SIDE, IT WOULDN'T BE AS DANGEROUS FOR THE US TO BE SEEN AS MADLY READY TO DO IT. UNFORTUNATELY, SU LEADERS WERE ABLE TO BE JUST AS MAD—AND UNPREDICTABLE TO US, WITHOUT OUR REALIZING IT! AN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN! (WHEREAS ANDROPOV SAW REAGAN AS BEING A KNOWN UNKNOWN!)

A 30 November 1983 memorandum entitled “Why Is the World so Dangerous?” circulated amongst Reagan administration principals.¹⁵⁹ Had the principals answered honestly, they would have said that the danger was due, in part, to the US policies which had helped to make it so. US foreign policy played a role in the 1983 Soviet-American War Scare. American curtailment of formal and informal contacts with the Soviets, introduction of newer, balance-shifting nuclear weapons and defense systems, and frequent rhetorical pledges to destroy communism, enflamed Soviet fears of a United States nuclear attack and pushed the world closer to the brink.

The superpower intelligence agencies also bore responsibility for this danger. The history of the 1983 War Scare is lauding to neither the CIA nor KGB. **Both sides were**

fundamentally wrong in their assumptions. [LIKE C-II!] Operation RYAN stands as a dubious example of the flawed intelligence which arrives from an agency which molds its evidence to fit predetermined conclusions. The Moscow Center asked its agents only for binary information, not its agents' opinions of what the information they had collected meant. There was no Western intention to launch a first strike; therefore ordering agents to detect one was remiss.

¹⁵⁹ The memorandum concluded the world was dangerous because the **Soviet Union was “running out of time.” It did not mention any US contribution to the danger. [Don’t we think, correctly, that Putin is running out of time? And we are contributing to his fears. What should we learn about what effect this may have on risk? More than I would have thought earlier!]** 30 November, 1983, Memo from Herbert E. Meyer Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Counsel for Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, “Why is the World so Dangerous?” in CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration NARA, College Park, MD.

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American intelligence also failed to believe the obvious. It refused to accept that the West's vast increase in nuclear strength combined with Reagan's harsh rhetoric made some in the Soviet Union believe that a Western nuclear strike was a possibility. This ignorance or whitewashing of genuine Soviet fear led to the continuation of confrontational policies which could have caused a desperate Soviet Union to lash out against the West. American intelligence believed there was virtually no chance of nuclear war and refused to conceive that its adversary could think otherwise.

Finally, the increased risk of nuclear miscalculation during Able Archer 83 chinks the theory of nuclear deterrence

[YES: e.g., AJW theory] and idea of the “long peace.”
 [][YES] The 1983 War Scare proves that the Cold War did not slowly wind down after the Cuban Missile Crisis.[YES] Rather, the danger of nuclear confrontation remained constant,[NO: détente; and 1984-91; it fluctuated] and at times – including during Able Archer 83 – escalated.[YES] By 1983, each side had only a *six minute* window to survive a nuclear attack.[NO: forces sufficient for Type I Deterrent would survive without warning; societies would not survive no matter how much warning.] Despite “nuclear learning,” and game theories, both of the superpowers became more unsafe as the Cold War progressed.[YES: and despite arms control negotiations and agreements.] While the USA and USSR maintained nuclear parity, both lacked nuclear security. [YES] The explanation to this nuclear paradox is simple: **Theories don’t shape the course of human events; men do.**[NOT ENTIRELY: E.G., IT WAS SIMPLY A WRONG THEORY THAT PARITY WAS SUFFICIENT FOR DETERRENCE.] Reagan was right when he wrote that the Soviet attack on KAL 007 negated “the moral precepts which guide human relations everywhere;”[NO he wasn’t; the US acted on the very same moral precepts when the Vincennes shot down an Iranian airliner. “Self-defense,” plus false alarm.] it also reaffirmed the danger of human irrationality.¹⁶⁰ [NO, this didn’t: see above] Cold War history must recount that human unpredictability was what caused the danger of nuclear war to be **ever-present** [YES] throughout the long peace— and, on more than one occasion, dangerously close.

¹⁶⁰ Reagan, *American Live*, 548.

[1. Has Jones compared his 2006 paper to the 2015 conclusions? How has PFIAB Report affected his conclusions since 2006? Other sources? To Fischer? To Pry?

2. Compare C-II and aa 83.

3. Compare to present. (See Pry)